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Intellectual quietness: our struggles with researching creativity as a process 
Viktor Dörfler ʹ Marc Stierand ʹ Robert Chia 
Introduction 
 ?dŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƌŝǀĞƌ ?ƐĐƵƌƌĞŶƚŶĞǀĞƌĨĂŝůƐ ?ƚŚĞǁĂƚĞƌƉĂƐƐŝŶŐ ?ŵŽŵĞŶƚďǇŵŽŵĞŶƚ ?ŝƐ
never the same.  Where the current pools, bubbles form on the surface, bursting 
and disappearing as others rise to replace them, none lasting long.  In this world, 
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĚǁĞůůŝŶŐ ƉůĂĐĞƐ ĂƌĞ ůŝŬĞ ƚŚĂƚ ? ĂůǁĂǇƐ ĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐ ? ?
<ĂŵŽŶŽŚƃŵĞŝ ?Đ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?,ƃũƃŬŝ 
In a recent article published in The Journal of Creative Behavior, StieraŶĚ ? ŽũĞ ? 'ůĉǀĞĂŶƵ ? 
Dörfler, Haley and Feuls ĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŝƐ ?ĂŶĞŵďŽĚŝĞĚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?ĂƐŽũŽƵƌŶ
in not only the social but also in the materiality aspect of creativity ?(Stierand et al., 2017, p. 
1), frequently appearing superficial and naïǀĞ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ?ƐƚŽƌŝĞƐŽĨ ?ŚĂǀŝŶŐĂŶŝĚĞĂ ?ĂƌĞŽĨƚĞŶ
post-factum reconstructions and re-organizations of a much more complex, messy, embodied, 
and non-ůŝŶĞĂƌ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?(Stierand et al., 2017, p. 1). The research project underlying this 
conference paper ambitiously aims to unearth the micro-processes that, together and over 
time and space, mould the creative process in context. In this particular paper, however, we 
only intend to discuss some of the most pressing methodological struggles we are currently 
facing. 
Ɛ ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂů ĨƌĂŵŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ǁĞ ďƵŝůĚ ŽŶ WŽůĄŶǇŝ ?Ɛ(1962, 1966, 
1969) ŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ ?ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ? and also include facets from the body of knowledge on  
 ?ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂůŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĂŶĚůĞĂƌŶŝŶŐ ?(Argyris & Schön, 1978; Davenport & Prusak, 2000; 
Easterby-Smith, Crossan, & Nicolini, 2000; Tsoukas, 2005), in general, and the creation of new 
knowledge, in particular (Dörfler, Baracskai, & Velencei, 2010; Stierand & Dörfler, 2015; 
Stierand, Dörfler, & MacBryde, 2014). 
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Researching creativity as a process 
The creative process is often more than a pure cognitive exercise and can also involve sensory 
knowing and play that happens in-between the sociomaterial entanglements that are 
characteristic of creative work. Ontologically, this means that the creative process cannot be 
understood in isolation from the social and material micro-processes intra-acting with humans 
(Barad, 2003, p. 815). These micro-processes consist of qualia that are experienced 
subjectively (Jackson, 1982; Lewis, 1929; Stierand & Dörfler, 2014). Epistemologically, this 
means that in order to capture the qualia of the creative micro-processes, we must unearth 
the ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůĂŶĚ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƉĂƚƚĞƌŶŝŶŐƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞƌĞĐƵƌƐŝǀĞůǇŝŶƚŝŵĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ 
fluxing and transforming of our life-ǁŽƌůĚƐ ?(Chia, 1995, pp. 581-582). Thus, methodologically, 
this means that we need to achieve a kind of intellectual quietness that would allow us to 
dwell in the sociomaterial phenomena unfolding around us and to be able to focus our 
attention on how the sociomaterial mirco-processes intra-act with the human mind during 
creative work (Dörfler, Stierand, & Zizka, 2017). This is not to say that entities and structures, 
which can be regarded as the effects of these micro-processes, cannot appear as stable, only 
this is not the stability of the rock but of the standing wave. That is, even if an entity appears 
stable, its attributes are continuously changiŶŐ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ?ƌĞĂůŝƚǇŝƐĚĞĞŵĞĚƚŽďĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐůǇ
ŝŶĨůƵǆĂŶĚƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŚĞŶĐĞƵŶƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂďůĞŝŶĂŶǇƐƚĂƚŝĐƐĞŶƐĞ ?(Chia, 1995, p. 579). 
Achieving intellectual quietness 
Today, millions of scholars worldwide steadily add new layers of knowledge often without 
questioning the layers beneath, thereby creating an academic system that almost exclusively 
believes in a pyramid conception of scientific knowledge (see Baracskai, 2000, p. 42). In such 
a system, achieving intellectual quietness is difficult if not impossible. This comment  ?ŵƵƐƚ
not be understood as a cynical or nihilistic tendency in contemporary thought but as a subtle 
and comƉůĞǆĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĂƚƌĞǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůďĂƐĞƐŽĨŵŽĚĞƌŶŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?(Chia, 2003, 
p. 114). Or, to say it in the words of Prigogine (2004, p. 10):  ?tĞ ĐĂŶŶŽƚ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐ
ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ďĞŝŶŐ ? ũƵƐƚ ĂƐ ǁĞ ĐĂŶŶŽƚ ŚĂǀĞ ůŝŐŚƚ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ĚĂƌŬŶĞƐƐ Žƌ ŵƵƐŝĐ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ƐŝůĞŶĐĞ ? ?
Therefore, Prigogine argues for a science that includes both being and becoming in its 
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formulation of the laws of nature and even goes beyond these laws ?dŚŝƐ ?ŐŽŝŶŐďĞǇŽŶĚ ?ĐĂŶ
be achieved by introducing chaos as a fundamental concept. Chaos, however, brings instability 
to the being aspect, which means that, instead of infinitely valid permanent laws of nature, 
we need to think in terms of probabilistic laws. This, in turn, leads to emergence of a spectrum 
of possibilities, meaning limited (i.e. numerous but not infinite) possible alternatives of 
becoming, which also depend on the image of the future.   
Towards a process philosophy of creativity 
In fields where the phenomenon of interest is inherently linked to understanding the process 
that makes the phenomenon, like in the field of creativity, we ŶĞĞĚƚŽ ?ƐĞĞŬĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞŵŽĚĞƐ
of expression that can allow the ephemeral aspects of process to be more adequately 
ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚ ? ?(Chia, 1995, p. 589)  The biggest problem of our academic system is not so much 
that we try to ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞ ?ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĚŽŶĞƚŽƚŚŝƐĞŵĞƌŐĞŶƚĂŶĚĞƉŚĞŵĞƌĂůƌĞĂůŝƚǇ
ǁŚĞŶ ǁĞ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚ ƚŽ ŝŵƉŽƐĞŽƵƌ ƐƚĂƚŝĐ ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌŝŶŐ ĐŽĚĞƐ ŽŶƚŽ ŝƚ ?(Chia, 1995, p. 590). Not 
enough, we continue to make it worse by confusing the representations with the reality that 
they are supposed to represent.   
Of course, we cannot completely suspend representations, at least when presenting our 
findings or results, but we can (at least try to) develop habits of critical reflexivity (Cunliffe, 
2009; Hibbert & Cunliffe, 2015; Hibbert, Sillince, Diefenbach, & Cunliffe, 2014) that help us 
delineating our thoughts from reality. We can also practice the use of metaphors and regularly 
invent new concepts to describe new thoughts, thereby accepting that we also need to be 
ready to give up concepts as they become obsolete.   
Researchers also need to develop what Keats (quoted by Chia & Morgan, 1996, p. 55) called 
ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ŝ ?Ğ ?ƚŚĞ ?ĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨďĞŝŶŐŝŶƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚŝĞƐ ?ŵǇƐƚĞƌŝĞƐ ?ĚŽƵďƚƐ ?ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ
ĂŶǇŝƌƌŝƚĂďůĞƌĞĂĐŚŝŶŐĂĨƚĞƌĨĂĐƚĂŶĚƌĞĂƐŽŶ ? ?ĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚƵƐ
data), the negative capability is also important for an achievement of comprehension when 
we accept that the reality does not play by the management textbooks, and that researchers 
inevitably have to face a lack of internal consistency in their emerging understanding. 
Sometimes inconsistencies will disappear during the research project, but often they can 
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persist for years. Thus, researchers need to develop an ability to cope with such situation  W 
and they need a framework in which a less then complete internal consistency can be 
accepted.   
Since there are multiple ways of experiencing the same phenomenon and there can be 
multiple interpretations of the same experience with different conclusions to draw, 
reƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐǁĞŶĞĞĚƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉĂŶĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽ ?ƐƚĂǇ ?ǁŝƚŚ ?ƚŚĞĞǆƉĞrience and to wallow in the 
open-endedness and indeterminacy of that experience, soaking it up until we are saturated 
ǁŝƚŚŝƚƐƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞĂŶĚĞŶĚƵƌŝŶŐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů ŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐĂƌĞĂƚƚĂŝŶĞĚ ?(Chia & Morgan, p. ibid).  In 
ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŚĞ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚĞĚ ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶ ? ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?ŚĞ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?Ɛ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
phenomenon in this context as well as the researcher herself/himself all need to be open-
ended in a process view.   
For that reason we introduce the principle of research indeterminacy to represent these 
characteristics. It is also important to note that accepting the above outlined epistemological 
stance is incompatible with a hasty collection of data and a rushed analysis that is not 
uncommon in academia due to the pressure to publish at ever-increasing rate.  It is important 
to admit that this means that the research process will be longer since, in order to achieve 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŝŶ Ă ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ǀŝĞǁ ? ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐ ŶĞĞĚ ƚŽ  ?ĞƐƚƌĂŶŐĞ ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞŝƌ
ƐǇŵďŽůŝĐƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĞŽĨĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?(Chia & Morgan, 1996, p. 55), reach an intellectual quietness 
in order to be able to immerse themselves in the phenomena unfolding around them, to tune 
their attention to their sensual as well as mental experiences. We need to combine active 
interrogation with contemplative listening or what Chia (ibid) ƌĞĨĞƌƐ ƚŽ ĂƐ  ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂů
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